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Abstract:   
In this paper, we measure the welfare costs/gains associated with financial market 
incompleteness in a monetary union. To do this, we build on a two-country model of a 
monetary union with sticky prices subject to asymmetric productivity shocks. For 
most plausible values of price stickiness, we show that asymmetric shocks under 
incomplete financial markets give rise to a lower volatility of national inflation rates, 
which proves welfare improving with respect to the situation of complete financial 
markets. The corresponding welfare gains are equivalent to an average increase of 
1.8% of permanent consumption. 
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1 Introduction
Financial markets integration is traditionally considered of great importance for the smooth
functioning of the European Monetary Union as it constitutes an insurance mechanism fostering
symmetric adjustment to asymmetric shocks. As a matter of fact, the costs of incompleteness in
financial markets, approximating imperfect financial integration, have been widely documented
(see, for instance, Cole and Obstfeld [1991] and Kim, Kim and Levin [2003a]). More recently,
using a two-country model subject to asymmetric productivity shocks, Benigno [2007] shows
that imperfect risk-sharing and the corresponding path of the real exchange rate generate welfare
costs under flexible prices allocations.1 Means to reduce these costs have also been explored in
the literature. For example, Cole and Obstfeld [1991] show that these types of costs might be
reduced by achieving a deeper trade integration, since incomplete financial market allocations
may replicate the complete asset markets allocations under specific hypotheses. In this paper,
we argue that the dynamics of inflation under alternative financial structures is likely to impact
the costs of financial markets incompleteness, by affecting real exchange rate dynamics and the
pattern of external adjustment.
Focusing on the euro area, recent empirical and theoretical evidence suggest that the common
monetary policy has been successful at keeping aggregate inflation low. However, they also
point out the impossibility for policymakers to address the consequences of asymmetric shocks
on national inflation rates. These sets of evidence lead us to raise the following question: what
are the welfare costs/gains associated with incomplete financial markets in a monetary union
with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and sticky prices? To address this question, we follow
Benigno [2007] and consider a two-country model of a monetary union with sticky prices subject
to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We model financial markets either as a continuum of state-
contingent assets, or as a single bond market. Under complete financial markets, each agent has
the same wealth and the Backus-Smith risk-sharing condition holds. Under incomplete financial
markets, agents trade composite bonds and use financial markets to smooth their adjustment to
asymmetric shocks, thereby restoring the external adjustment channel of the current account.
However, since this solution generates a unit root on net foreign assets dynamics, we follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003] and assume the existence of financial intermediaries levying
portfolio management quadratic costs, depending on the level of bonds traded.
1In his model, flexible prices allocations are restored assuming efficient price stability policies in both countries.
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We differ from Benigno [2007] by allowing sticky prices to generate additional inefficiencies.
We show that the optimal targeting rules implied by the optimal policy stabilize the aggregate
inflation rate and close the aggregate consumption gap.2 However, monetary instrument rules
that the common central bank may actually use to stabilize the economy, i.e. using a single
interest rate, prevent the stabilization of national inflation rates, which generates additional
welfare losses with respect to the optimal policy. These losses are crucial in generating our
results.
Based on this framework, we evaluate the welfare costs that a monetary union may endure
when financial market are complete vs incomplete under simple interest rate rules stabilizing the
aggregate inflation rate and consumption gap. We more specifically highlight the key role of the
assumption of price stickiness in determining the Pareto–dominant situation. When prices are
flexible, incomplete financial markets imply imperfect risk–sharing that turns to welfare losses.
These results are consistent with the ones of Kim et al. [2003a]. This case also corresponds to the
situation where independent national monetary policies stabilize national inflation rates. Under
such a policy, the volatility of inflation rates and their related welfare losses are equal to zero.
Our results thus comfort those of Benigno [2007]. In line with Cole and Obstfeld [1991], we also
find that a better integration of goods markets, approximated by an increase of the openness
parameter or an increase of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
lowers the welfare losses of imperfect financial integration. When prices are sticky, we show that
financial markets incompleteness implies a lower volatility of national inflation rates, thereby
generating welfare gains with respect to the situation of complete financial markets. Under
incomplete financial markets, agents may use financial markets and the channel of the current
account to adjust externally and to smooth their consumption profiles in time, thus lowering the
pressure on the terms of trade. As a consequence, the degree of volatility of national inflation
rates required to adjust to asymmetric shocks is lower. This mechanism leads to significant
welfare gains that more than compensate the welfare losses due to imperfect risk–sharing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the
dynamics of the model and the authorities’ loss function. Section 4 determines the optimal
(Ramsey) policy. Section 5 analyzes the dynamics of the model after an asymmetric productivity
2In the model, we assume that governments offset first–order distortions, thereby restoring the Pareto–efficiency
of the steady state. This assumption also avoids that optimal monetary policy targets a non–zero aggregate
inflation rate.
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shock. Section 6 presents the welfare costs of complete versus incomplete financial markets and
proceed to some robustness experiments. Conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2 A two–country model
The model describes a two–country monetary union with a common central bank that controls
the nominal interest rate. Each country is populated by a continuum of households of infinite
life, an infinite number of firms that are specialized in the production of differentiated goods
and a government. Goods markets are characterized by a home bias in consumption bundles
and Calvo–staggered adjustment of prices.
2.1 Households and financial markets
In each country the representative household j ∈ [0, 1] of country i ∈ {h, f} maximizes a welfare
index,
ωit(j) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{
Cit(j)
1−ρ
1− ρ −
N it (j)
1+ψ
1 + ψ
}
, (1)
subject to the budget constraint,3
Bit+1(j)−RtBit(j) =W itN it (j) + Πit(j)− P itCit(j)− Pi,tACit(j)− T it (j), (2)
and the transversality condition, limT→∞ΠTτ=tR−1τ Et
{
BiT+1(j)
}
= 0. In (1), the parameter
β = (1 + δ)−1 is the subjective discount factor, Cit(j) is the consumption bundle chosen by
the representative agent, N it (j) is its competitive labor supply, ρ is the degree of consumption
risk–aversion and ψ−1 is the elasticity of labor supply. In (2),W it is the nominal wage in country
i for period t, Πit(j) =
∫ 1
0 Π
i
t(k, j)dk is the profit paid by national firms to the representative
national agent j. Bit(j) corresponds to the holding of the composite one–period nominal bond at
the end of period (t− 1) which pays a gross nominal rate of interest Rt between periods (t− 1)
and t, T it (j) is a lump-sum tax paid by household j to the national government of country i.
Finally, P it is the consumer price index in country i in period t, Pi,t is the producer price index in
country i in period t and ACit(j) is a portfolio adjustment cost paid in units of domestic goods.
In the case detailed above, the financial market of the monetary union is incomplete and
households trade a one–period composite financial asset. Buying (resp. selling) bonds affects
3The model features no money holdings, since money is endogenously supplied depending on the level of
nominal interest rate.
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negatively (resp. positively) the individualized interest rate, so that: (i) agents have a strong
incentive to return to their initial position in the long run; and (ii) agents belonging to a creditor
country face lower nominal interest rates than agents in the debtor country. As underlined by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003], this assumption is a convenient way to balance the current
account in the long run between union members while preserving its short–run dynamics. We
impose a standard quadratic form for portfolio adjustment costs,
ACit(j) =
χ
2
[
Bit+1(j)−Bi(j)
]2
.
where Bi(j) is the steady state level of financial assets hold by agent j in country i. Portfolio
adjustment costs affect the Euler condition since,
βIit+1Et
{
P itC
i
t(j)
ρ
P it+1C
i
t+1(j)ρ
}
= 1, (3)
with, Iit+1(j) = Rt+1
[
1 + χPi,t(Bit+1(j)−Bi(j))
]−1. The value of χ affects the intertemporal
consumption choice in (3): an increase in the cost of bond trading reduces the sensitivity of
wealth accumulation to variation in the interest rate, because it becomes more costly to smooth
consumption.
In the case of complete markets, agents are supposed to have access to a continuum of
Arrow–Debreu securities and portfolio costs vanish (χ = 0 and ACit = 0). In such a case,
the Backus–Smith condition holds, implying that each agent’s wealth is the same across the
monetary union,
P ht C
h
t (j)
ρ = P ft C
f
t (j)
ρ, ∀t.
The labor supply function is standard since it depends on the level of consumption and the
real wage,
N it (j)
ψ =
W it
P itC
i
t(j)ρ
.
Following Corsetti [2006], we assume home bias in final consumption bundles. The consump-
tion bundle of consumer j living in country i, Cit(j), is
Cit(j) =
[
(1− αi)
1
µ
(
Cih,t(j)
)µ−1
µ + α
1
µ
i
(
Cif,t(j)
)µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
,
and the companion consumption price index P it is,
P it =
[
(1− αi)
(
P ih,t
)1−µ + αi (P if,t)1−µ] 11−µ ,
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where αi ∈
[
0, 12
]
is the home bias, which also measures the openness of the final goods market
in country i, and µ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
Consumption subindexes are,
Cih,t(j) =
[∫ 1
0
Cih,t(k, j)
θ−1
θ dk
] θ
θ−1
, and Cif,t(j) =
[∫ 1
0
Cif,t(k, j)
θ−1
θ dk
] θ
θ−1
.
Cih,t(k, j) (resp. C
i
f,t(k, j)) is the consumption of a typical final good k of home (resp. foreign)
country by the representative consumer j of country i and θ > µ is the elasticity of substitution
between national varieties of final goods. We assume that firms do not discriminate the market
they address and that their retail prices are identical in both countries. The corresponding
prices of domestic and foreign goods in country i are, P ih,t = Ph,t = [
∫ 1
0 Ph,t(k)
1−θdk]
1
1−θ and
P if,t = Pf,t = [
∫ 1
0 Pf,t(k)
1−θdk]
1
1−θ , respectively.
Accordingly, optimal variety demands are,
Cih,t(k, j) = (1− αi)
[
Ph,t
P it
]−µ [Ph,t(k)
Ph,t
]−θ
Cit(j), C
i
f,t(k, j) = αi
[
Pf,t
P it
]−µ [Pf,t(k)
Pf,t
]−θ
Cit(j).
Since portfolio costs are paid in units of goods, i.e. ACit(j) = [
∫ 1
0 AC
i
t(k, j)
θ−1
θ dk]
θ
θ−1 , they
imply variety demands, defined as ACit(k, j) =
[
Ph,t(k)
Ph,t
]−θ
ACit(j).
Finally, we define the terms of trade as,
St =
Pf,t
Ph,t
.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce k varieties in country i ∈ {h, f} using national labor according to a standard
technology,
Y it (k) = A
i
tL
i
t(k), with A
i
t+1 = (1− ρa)Ai + ρaAit + ξit+1,
where ξit+1 is an i.i.d innovation.
Following Calvo [1983], we assume that in economy i ∈ {h, f}, a fraction (1− ηi) of randomly
selected firms is allowed to set new prices each period. Firms set prices higher in comparison of
the typical mark-up pricing, depending on the expected period during which they will be unable
to reset. The corresponding optimal price is,
P ∗i,t(k) =
θ
(θ − 1) (1− τ)
∞∑
v=0
(
ηiβ
)v
Et
{
Y it+ν(k)
P it+νC
i
t+ν(j)ρ
W it /A
i
t
}
∞∑
v=0
(
ηiβ
)v
Et
{
Y it+ν(k)
P it+νC
i
t+ν(j)ρ
} .
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In this expression, τ is a subsidy that compensates the distorting effects of monopolistic
competition in the economy.4 Y it (k) is the aggregate demand facing firm k on the final goods
market. Aggregating among final firms and assuming behavioral symmetry of Calvo producers,
the average price of final goods in nation i ∈ {h, f} is,
Pi,t =
[(
1− ηi)P ∗i,t(k) 1−θ + ηiP 1−θi,t−1] 11−θ .
2.3 Governments
Fiscal policy is aimed at closing first order distortions related to the monopolistic structure of
final goods markets. Governments finance the corresponding subsidy made to firms through a
lump-sum tax on households. Their budget constraint is,∫ 1
0
T it (j)dj = −τ
∫ 1
0
Pi,t(k)Y it (k)dk.
2.4 General equilibrium
For any sequence of productivity shocks
{
Aht , A
f
t
}∞
t=0
, an equilibrium is a sequence of quantity{Qt}∞t=0
where Qt =
{
Y ht , Y
f
t , C
h
t , C
f
t , N
h
t , N
f
t , B
h
t , B
f
t , AC
h
t , AC
f
t
}∞
t=0
that satisfies households and firms
optimality conditions for a given set of prices {Pt}∞t=0 =
{
W ht ,W
f
t , P
h
t , P
f
t , Ph,t, P
f
f,t, P
∗
h,t(k), P
∗
f,t(k)
}∞
t=0
in a way that is compatible with the clearing of markets described below.
Defining aggregate supply bundles as Y it =
[∫ 1
0 Y
i
t (k)
θ−1
θ dk
] θ
θ−1 and assuming αh = α and
αf = 1− α, final goods markets clear according to,
Y ht = (1− α)
[
Ph,t
P ht
]−µ
Cht + α
[
Ph,t
P ft
]−µ
Cft +AC
h
t ,
Y ft = (1− α)
[
Pf,t
P ft
]−µ
Cft + α
[
Pf,t
P ht
]−µ
Cht +AC
f
t .
Labor is immobile, so that N it =
∫ 1
0 N
i
t (j)dj =
∫ 1
0 L
i
t(k)dk, and the aggregate production
function of country i ∈ {h, f} is Y it DPi,t = AitN it , where DPi,t =
∫ 1
0
[
Pi,t(k)
Pi,t
]−θ
dk ≥ 1 is the
dispersion of production prices in country i.
The international financial market clearing condition is,∫ 1
0
Bht (j)dj +
∫ 1
0
Bft (j)dj = 0.
4Monopolistic competition distorts the first-best allocation through mark-up pricing and a lower output. As
shown by Benigno and Woodford [2005], an optimal subsidy policy restores the optimal perfectly competitive
allocation.
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Finally, consolidating households, governments and firms resources constraints, the dynamics
of net foreign assets in country h is given by
Bht+1 −RtBht = Ph,tY ht − P ht Cht . (4)
3 A linear-quadratic framework
We solve the model applying standard linearization methods. We first define the optimal mon-
etary policy as the minimization of a welfare loss function constrained by the model. This
approach usually requires that the model is solved with a second order approximation, to avoid
spurious welfare reversals documented by Kim, Kim and Levin [2003b]. However, Benigno and
Woodford [2006] have shown that the solution of the optimal policy problem can be set in the
convenient linear-quadratic form while remaining valid when the second order approximation
of the welfare–based loss function yields a purely quadratic function, which is the case in our
framework.
3.1 Steady state
We solve the model in logdeviation with respect to the symmetric steady state. In the symmetric
steady state Ai = A = 1 and Bi = B = 0. Symmetry imposes Ph = Pf = P h = P f = P ∗i (k)
= P , implying, W
i
P i
= WP =
(θ−1)(1−τ)
θ A. The compensation of first order distortions requires
that the government sets τ = (1− θ)−1 ≤ 0, implying WP = A. Portfolio costs are zero so that
I = R = β−1. Price indexes are such that DP = 1, final goods markets give C = Y , and the
production function is Y = AN . Combining these relations with the leisure arbitrage, we get,
Y = A
1+ψ
ψ+ρ . For tractability, we simply assume A = 1, implying Y = C = N = WP = 1. Since
the model features no money holding, the price level is defined arbitrarily to P = 1.
3.2 The model in deviation from the natural equilibrium
The natural equilibrium, corresponding to the flexible price equilibrium with complete financial
markets, is considered as the benchmark for the definition of the optimal policy. We thus
express the linear dynamics of the model in deviation from the natural equilibrium. Applying
the standard linearization procedure, we consider xit as the logdeviation of X
i
t , ∀t for i ∈ {h, f}
from the steady state. Defining x˜t as the natural equilibrium dynamics of xt, we finally define
the deviation of a variable from the natural equilibrium as x̂t = xt − x˜t.
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3.2.1 The case of complete financial markets
Under complete financial markets, the model expressed in deviation from the natural equilibrium
is given by
n̂rt = −$αŝt, (5)
ρEt
{
ĉut+1 − ĉut
}
=
δ
1 + δ
r̂t+1 − Et
{
piut+1
}
, (6)
ρEt
{
ĉrt+1 − ĉrt
}
= − (1− 2α)Et
{
pirt+1
}
, (7)
pih,t = βEt {pih,t+1}+ kh
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut − ψn̂rt +
1
2
ŝt
]
, (8)
pif,t = βEt {pif,t+1}+ kf
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut + ψn̂
r
t −
1
2
ŝt
]
, (9)
ŝt − ŝt−1 = pif,t − pih,t + 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t −
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
art−1, (10)
where $α =
(1−2α)2+4ρµα(1−α)
2ρ and k
i = (
1−ηiβ)(1−ηi)
ηi
. In these expressions, x˜ut =
1
2(x˜
h
t + x˜
f
t ) is
the average value of Xt in the monetary union and x˜rt =
1
2(x˜
f
t − x˜ht ) its relative value. Eq. (5) is
the contraction of the relative expression of the final goods market equilibria (for the right-hand
side element) and the relative production functions (for the left-hand side element). Eqs. (6)
and (7) summarize the relative and union-wide expressions of Euler equations. Eqs. (8) and (9)
are the expressions for modified Phillips curves, obtained by expressing marginal cost in terms
of variables in deviation from the natural equilibrium.
3.2.2 The case of incomplete financial markets
We now expose the dynamic equilibrium under incomplete financial markets. Since B = 0, we
define the loglinear expression of Bit as b
i
t =
Bit/C
P it
. The model in deviation from the natural
equilibrium under incomplete financial markets is,
n̂rt = (1− 2α) ĉrt − 2µα (1− α) ŝt, (11)
ρEt
{
ĉut+1 − ĉut
}
=
δ
1 + δ
r̂t+1 − Et
{
piut+1
}
, (12)
ρEt
{
ĉrt+1 − ĉrt
}
= χb̂ht+1 − (1− 2α)Et
{
pirt+1
}
, (13)
pih,t = βEt {pih,t+1}+ kh [(ρ+ ψ) ĉut − ψn̂rt − ρĉrt + αŝt] , (14)
pif,t = βEt {pif,t+1}+ kf [(ρ+ ψ) ĉut + ψn̂rt + ρĉrt − αŝt] , (15)
ŝt − ŝt−1 = pif,t − pih,t + 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t −
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
art−1, (16)
b̂ht+1 − b̂ht = δb̂ht + α [2µ (1− α)− 1] ŝt + 2αĉrt . (17)
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The equations are slightly modified with respect to the case of complete financial markets.
Since the Backus-Smith condition does not hold anymore, Eq.(11) indicates that the equilibrium
of the final goods markets depends both on relative consumption and on the terms of trade.
Eq.(12) is unchanged. Eq.(13) is the contraction of Euler equations and shows how that the
Backus-Smith condition is broken, since χb̂ht+1 is the gap between relative consumptions and
the terms of trade. Using the current account b̂ht+1 to adjust externally clearly increases the
distance from perfect international risk-sharing. Eqs. (14) and (15) are the expressions for
modified Phillips curves when relative consumptions and the terms of trade are not tied by the
Backus-Smith condition. Eq.(16) is unchanged. Finally, Eq.(17) describes the dynamics of net
foreign assets where α [2µ (1− α)− 1] ŝt + 2αĉrt is the trade balance.
3.3 The authorities loss function
To determine the optimal policy and to rank alternative situations, we adopt a welfare measure
based on the aggregate utility function,
ωT =
1
2
∫ 1
0
ωhT (j)dj +
1
2
∫ 1
0
ωfT (j)dj,
where, after using symmetry among agents,
ωiT (j) = ω
i
T =
T∑
t=0
βtE0
{(
Cit
)1−ρ
(1− ρ) −
(
N it
)1+ψ
(1 + ψ)
}
.
The welfare measure is computed using second–order approximations of ωT and equilibrium
conditions, and expressed as a quadratic function of endogenous variables in deviation from their
natural equilibrium paths,
ωT = −C
1−ρ
2
T∑
t=0
βtE0{ θ2khpi
2
h,t +
θ
2kf
pi2f,t + (ρ+ ψ) [ĉ
u
t ]
2
+ µα (1− α) [ŝt]2 + ρ [ĉrt ]2 + ψ [n̂rt ]2}+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) . (18)
The welfare measure (18) admits standard arguments, such as national inflation rates and the
aggregate consumption gap. However, the welfare measure also penalizes regional asymmetries,
since deviations of terms of trade, of relative consumption and of relative effort are costly.
4 Optimal policy under complete financial markets
In this section, we compute the optimal plan under complete financial markets. It is defined as
the minimization of the welfare loss function (18) subject to the linear dynamic system (5)-(10).
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Assuming that the social planner can commit for an infinity of periods and adopting Wood-
ford’s (2003) timeless perspective, the optimal policy is obtained by minimizing the following
Lagrangian,
L =
T∑
t=0
βtEt{ θ2khpi
2
h,t +
θ
2kf
pi2f,t + (ρ+ ψ) [ĉ
u
t ]
2 + µα (1− α) [ŝt]2 + ρ [ĉrt ]2 + ψ [n̂rt ]2
+ 2Λ1,t
[
pih,t − βEt {pih,t+1} − kh
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut − ψn̂rt +
1
2
ŝt
]]
+ 2Λ2,t
[
pif,t − βEt {pif,t+1} − kf
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut + ψn̂
r
t −
1
2
ŝt
]]
+ 2Λ3,t
[
ŝt − ŝt−1 − pif,t + pih,t − 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t +
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
art−1
]
}.
After some algebra, first order conditions collapse to the following optimal targeting rules,
θ
2
(pih,t + pif,t) = − (1− κ)
(
ĉut − ĉut−1
)− Λ3,t (kh − kf) ,
θ
2
(pif,t − pih,t) = −
(
n̂rt − n̂rt−1
)
+ Λ3,t
(
kh + kf
)
,
(Λ3,t−1 − βΛ3,t) = −$αŝt−1 − αn̂rt−1,
ĉrt = −
(1− 2α)
2ρ
ŝt,
augmented with the following constraints,
pih,t = βEt {pih,t+1}+ kh
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut − ψn̂rt +
1
2
ŝt
]
,
pif,t = βEt {pif,t+1}+ kf
[
(ρ+ ψ) ĉut + ψn̂
r
t −
1
2
ŝt
]
,
ŝt − ŝt−1 = pif,t − pih,t + 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t −
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
art−1.
The corresponding 7 equations - 7 variables recursive system requires that the condition
kh = kf = k is verified to have a unique and stable solution.
In the equilibrium, combining the first optimal targeting rule with the Phillips curves implies
that the aggregate inflation rate is fully stabilized (piut = 0) and that the aggregate consumption
gap is closed (ŷut = 0). This result is quite standard in the literature and implies that the
optimal instrument rule is to equate the nominal interest rate to the natural interest rate.
However, the solution of the optimal monetary policy problem also features some motivation
for regional stabilization. These goals are clearly beyond the control of the common central
bank and the optimal plan as a whole can not be decentralized due the restricted set of available
policy instruments.
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For that reason, next sections explore the welfare implications of alternative financial struc-
tures under monetary policies that the common central bank may actually implement (r̂t+1 = 0).
In the rest of the paper, we refer to these policies as feasible policies. The corresponding wel-
fare losses are expressed in terms of their distance to the optimal plan under complete financial
markets.
5 Dynamics under feasible monetary policy
In this section, we calibrate the model under both complete and incomplete financial markets.
We then analyze the dynamic properties in both cases and highlight the mechanisms behind our
results.
5.1 Baseline calibration
We calibrate the deep parameters of the model based on standard values found in the literature.
Following Beetsma and Jensen [2005], the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is ρ = 2. The
value of ψ refers to Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2006] and varies between 5 and 15. For the
baseline case, we choose ψ = 5. In the literature, estimates of µ, the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods, range from 1 to 15. For example, estimates of Harrigan
[1993] range from 5 to 12. We set µ = 2 and then check for robustness with other values of
this parameter. The elasticity of substitution across varieties determines the average mark-up,
which according to Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] is around 16-17% , implying θ = 7. We set
the openness parameter to α = 0.25 in the benchmark calibration and, following Faia [2007],
we let it vary from 0.25 to 0.4. The parameter controlling nominal rigidities ranges, according
to different estimates, from 0.5 to 0.8. Following Canzoneri et al. [2006], we set the baseline
value at ηh = ηf = 0.75. The portfolio cost parameter χ is set to 0.001, corresponding to an
average annual interest rate premium of 0.405%, in line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003] and
Benigno [2007]. Other parameters are fairly standard: β = 0.988, ρa = 0.95 and std
(
ξit
)
= 0.7%.
5.2 Dynamics under complete financial markets
In the case of complete financial markets, the perfect risk-sharing condition holds implying that
relative wealth in each country is the same, namely,
ĉrt = −
(1− 2α)
2ρ
ŝt.
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The intuition behind our results is that the pattern of external adjustment after an asymmet-
ric productivity shock and its internal consequences, as it can be seen through the expressions
of New-Keynesian Phillips curves, may significantly affect inflation dynamics, which is the most
heavily weighted component of the welfare measure (Eq. 18).
Under complete financial markets, the dynamic system is described by Eqs. (5)-(10) and by
r̂t+1 = 0, ∀t. Figure 1 plots the IRF of interest variables in the monetary union after a unit
domestic productivity innovation in the case of complete financial markets.
A productivity shock generates a deflation at home and the nominal interest rate drops
to stabilize aggregate inflation. This policy translates into a positive demand shock for the
foreign country and implies a significant inflation in this country (exactly equal to the domestic
deflation). The dynamics of inflation rates generates a positive (resp. negative) wealth effect
for home (resp. foreign) agents, allowing them to sustain higher (resp. lower) consumption
levels. The corresponding negative relative consumption gap implies a positive terms of trade
gap through the Backus-Smith condition. In other words, the terms of trade increase more than
in the natural equilibrium to meet the external equilibrium. The global pattern of external
adjustment relies entirely on terms of trade and the current account does not play any role.5
5.3 Dynamics under incomplete financial markets
The main difference with last paragraph is the introduction of an additional external adjustment
channel through the current account. As a consequence, paths of relative consumption and terms
of trade are determined independently. Under incomplete financial markets, the economy evolves
according to the system (11)-(17) augmented with the monetary policy r̂t+1 = 0, ∀t.
Figure 2 depicts the responses to a unit domestic productivity innovation. Similar to the
case of complete financial markets, domestic inflation falls and foreign inflation increases. The
adjustment pattern is somewhat different, however. The fall and rise of home and foreign
inflation is stronger in the first periods but the absolute cumulated response is lower.6 The gap
in relative consumptions is still negative, implying that home agents sustain higher consumption
levels thanks to the wealth effect induced by national inflation rates dynamics. Contrary to the
5In the simple case of unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, complete financial
markets even imply a constant zero net foreign assets position (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2001]). Otherwise,
net foreign assets are determined after terms of trade dynamics and do not enter in the definition of the dynamic
equilibrium.
6The cumulated response of inflation is ±0.3867 under incomplete financial markets and ±0.3929 under com-
plete financial markets.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a unit productivity innovation under complete financial
markets.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a unit productivity innovation under incomplete financial
markets.
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case of complete financial markets, the gap in terms of trade is negative. In the case of incomplete
financial markets, terms of trade volatility is lower than under complete financial markets and
lower than in the natural equilibrium. When shocks are transitory, agents are more prone to use
the current account as a device to smooth consumption over time and rely less on terms of trade
to adjust externally. Consequently, the shock implies an accumulation of net foreign assets and
terms of trade do not increase as much as they would with purely flexible prices, translating
into a negative terms of trade gap.
External adjustment to asymmetric shocks relies exclusively on relative prices under complete
financial markets and more on quantities under incomplete markets. As a consequence, terms
of trade gaps are more volatile under incomplete financial markets but terms of trade variations
(st − st−1 = pif,t − pih,t) and national inflation rates (pif,t and pih,t) are less volatile. Since
the volatility of national inflation rates is the most weighted component of the welfare loss
function, incomplete financial markets exhibit welfare enhancing properties that may reverse
the traditional welfare costs associated with financial markets incompleteness.
6 Welfare costs/gains
In this section, we measure the welfare costs or gains arising under alternative financial structures
in a monetary union subject to asymmetric productivity shocks. We highlight (i) the welfare
losses of incomplete financial markets when prices are flexible and (ii) the welfare gains of
incomplete financial markets when the degree of price stickiness reaches a certain threshold. In
such a case, we show that financial markets incompleteness is associated with a lower volatility
of national inflation rates since the external adjustment after asymmetric productivity shocks
relies more on quantities and less on terms of trade. For most plausible values of parameters
and as long as η is larger than 0.4, we provide evidence that the corresponding welfare gains
more than compensate the welfare costs related to imperfect risk-sharing. Finally, we assess the
robustness of our results by running a sensitivity analysis.
Welfare gains are expressed in terms of permanent consumption, so that,
ΩT = 100 ·
[
1− β
ρ+ ψ
(
ωrefT − ωT
)] 12
,
where ωrefT is the welfare in the reference situation. In order to decompose our results, the
reference situation will be the optimal plan under complete financial markets and the feasible
policy under complete financial markets alternatively.
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6.1 Price stickiness and welfare
Welfare losses of alternative financial structures and monetary policies are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Welfare losses.
Flexible prices∗ Sticky prices
Ωinc/com Ωcom/opt Ωinc/opt Ωinc/com
Baseline 0.46 1.12 -1.41 -1.80
ψ = 10 0.33 0.84 -0.90 -1.23
ψ = 15 0.27 0.70 -0.69 -0.98
ρ = 1 0.50 1.11 -1.62 -1.97
ρ = 5 0.37 0.99 -1.09 -1.47
α = 0.35 0.25 0.95 -0.92 -1.32
α = 0.4 0.16 0.90 -0.76 -1.18
α = 0.5 0.00 0.87 -0.53 -1.01
µ = 1 0.83 2.25 -2.91 -3.68
µ = 5 0.20 0.41 -0.46 -0.62
µ = 10 0.10 0.21 -0.19 -0.28
η = 0.7 - 0.79 -1.15 -1.40
η = 0.8 - 1.69 -1.70 -2.40
ρa = 0.9 1.02 3.94 -1.23 -4.12
ρa = 0.99 0.07 0.13 -0.25 -0.28
∗ for stability reasons, we set η = 0.0001 ' 0
Note: for α = 0.5 under flexible prices, the loss is 0.0001%.
Consistent with other studies (see Kim et al. [2003a]), when prices are flexible, we find that
incomplete financial markets imply imperfect risk-sharing, generating welfare losses rising to an
average decrease of permanent consumption of about 0.5% (first column of Table 1). Alter-
natively, interpreting the situation of flexible prices as a situation where independent national
monetary policies stabilize national inflation rates, our results comfort those of Benigno [2007],
especially when home bias in consumption vanishes (α = 12). We also find that a better inte-
gration of goods markets, approximated by an increase of the openness parameter (α) or an
increase of the elasticity of substitution (µ), may lower the welfare losses of imperfect financial
integration, as documented by Cole and Obstfeld [1991].
When prices are sticky, we highlight the fact that inflation variability is lower under in-
complete financial markets. As demonstrated by the analysis of response functions after an
asymmetric home productivity shock, incomplete financial markets introduce an additional ex-
ternal adjustment channel and restore the role of the current account. Since agents may use this
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channel to adjust externally, the pressure on terms of trade is lower. As a consequence, national
inflation rates are much less volatile for most plausible values of parameters of the model, as
depicted in Table 2. The volatility of inflation rates is even lower under incomplete financial
markets and feasible monetary policy than in the case of complete financial under the optimal
plan.
Table 2: Standard deviations (%) - Baseline calibration.
std(pih,t) std(pif,t) std(ĉut ) std(ŝt) std(ĉ
r
t ) std(n̂
r
t )
Complete financial markets
Flexible prices* − − − − − −
Sticky prices
- Optimal policy 1.4207 1.4207 − 0.1739 0.0217 0.0604
- Feasible policy 1.5070 1.5070 − 0.0856 0.0695 0.0000
Incomplete financial markets
Flexible prices* − − − 0.8813 0.7834 0.2682
Sticky prices 1.2580 1.2580 − 0.9228 0.7773 0.3101
∗ for stability reasons, we set η = 0.0001 ' 0
In the loss function and for the baseline calibration, weights on inflation are θ2k ' 40 while
weights on terms of trade gaps in relative consumptions and relative hours are respectively
µα (1− α) ' 0.37, ρ = 2 and ψ = 5. As a consequence, welfare gains associated with lower
volatility of inflation rates more than compensate for welfare losses related to higher volatility
of gaps in terms of trade, relative consumptions or relative hours. The situation of incom-
plete financial markets thus Pareto–dominates the situation of complete financial markets in a
monetary union characterized by sticky prices.
The welfare gains reported in the third and fourth column of Table 1 are clearly related
to the reduction of the volatility of inflation rates caused by the use of the current account
in the external adjustment of the economies. In this case, the distortion related to financial
markets incompleteness, which is costly in terms of welfare when prices are flexible, generates
a positive externality through a lower volatility of national inflation rates. The situation of
incomplete financial markets thus enhances the welfare of about 1.8% in average with respect
to the situation of complete financial markets under feasible monetary policy.
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6.2 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity results may be summarized as follows:
(i): The Frischian elasticity ψ lowers the welfare losses independently of the financial struc-
ture, since fluctuations have less impact on hours worked.
(ii): The risk aversion parameter ρ is one of the most important. Under incomplete financial
markets, an increase of ρ increases agents’ incentives to smooth consumption over time when
(unanticipated) transitory shocks arise. By this effect, ρ has a positive impact on welfare gains.
However, under complete financial markets, the Backus-Smith condition is binding and implies
that, for a given volatility of relative consumptions, higher values of ρ lower the volatility of
terms of trade required to adjust externally, i.e. the volatility of national inflation rates. This
second effect more than compensates the first effect and the welfare distance between complete
and incomplete situations is reduced by an increase in ρ.
(iii): The same applies to the openness parameter, α. On one hand, α increases the vol-
ume of goods traded and implies a higher volatility of the current account. Since the current
account is at the heart of our results, an increase of α should amplify welfare gains associated
with incomplete financial markets. On the other hand, the risk-sharing condition shows that a
higher value of α implies a lower response in the terms of trade to a given variation of relative
consumptions. The implied lower terms of trade and inflation differentials volatility is welfare
enhancing and, again, dominates the first effect.
(iv): The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, µ, has a negative
impact on welfare gains associated with incomplete financial markets. When goods become
better substitutes, the expenditure–switching effect is higher for a given variation of relative
prices, i.e. terms of trade, or the required variation of terms of trade to meet the external
equilibrium is lower. As a consequence, external adjustment through quantities becomes less
attractive and less effective in comparison to adjustment through prices.
(v): The nominal rigidity parameter has a positive impact on welfare gains associated with
incomplete financial markets. When inflation differentials become more persistent, a situation
that lowers cumulated inflation and provides a quicker adjustment is highly welfare enhancing.
Moreover, higher η is associated with lower ki and improves the weight of inflation in the
welfare function. Running simulations across the whole spectrum of possible values of η, we
also highlight in Figure 3 the fact that when prices become more flexible, there is a point at
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Figure 3: Welfare gains for different levels of nominal rigidities (η) and of financial market
incompleteness (χ).
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which financial markets incompleteness becomes costly in terms of welfare. For the baseline
calibration of the model, the threshold value corresponds to η = 0.4. These simulations also
show that, when inflation is not too costly, the benefits associated with lower inflation rates
through incomplete financial markets disappear. In such a case, just as in Benigno [2007], the
costs of imperfect risk-sharing dominate the costs of price stickiness. Figure 3 also reports the
welfare gains of financial markets incompleteness for varying values of portfolio management
costs. Our results are clearly unsensitive to variations in the value of χ since welfare gains range
from 1.85% to 1.69% when χ ranges from 0 to 0.01, which corresponds to an average annual
interest rate premium ranging from nearly 0% to 4%.
(vi): The persistence parameter ρa has a negative impact on welfare gains associated with
incomplete financial markets. Higher persistence generates less incentives for agents to smooth
the consequences of asymmetric shocks on their wealths and enhances their incentives to adjust
permanently. As a consequence, the appeal of smoother consumption and hours and lower
inflation disappears as shocks become more persistent.7
7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that financial market incompleteness leads to welfare gains in a monetary
union subject to productivity shocks and sticky prices. This effect results from the fact that
incomplete financial markets are associated with a reduction of the volatility of national inflation
rates in a monetary union, even when the aggregate inflation rate is stabilized by the central
bank. Lower national inflation rates are associated with higher levels of aggregate welfare
since agents highly penalize inflation variations. Under complete financial markets, external
adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks implies terms of trade movements but the current account
does not play any role. Under incomplete financial markets, agents may use the current account
to smooth the consequences of asymmetric shocks differently across countries. This possibility
implies a smoother path for the terms of trade and national inflation rates, which increases
welfare. For most plausible values of price stickiness, this effect dominates the welfare losses
of imperfect risk-sharing associated with incomplete financial markets, that are consequently
welfare dominant. We quantify the corresponding welfare gains to an average increase of 1.8%
in permanent consumption.
7Our results are robust to several extensions, such as the introduction of demand shocks, exemplified in this
model by the introduction of public spending shocks (see Auray and Eyquem [2007]).
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Appendix
The natural equilibrium
We define the natural (Pareto-efficient) equilibrium as the economic equilibrium arising when
prices are flexible under complete asset markets, i.e. ηh = ηf = 0 and χ = 0.
We firstly derive the natural path of aggregate variables, defined as,
xut =
1
2
[
xht + x
f
t
]
.
Using the pricing equations, ph,t = wht − aht and pf,t = wft − aft , and adding them,
wut − put = aut .
Using the aggregate leisure-consumption arbitrage,
ψnut + ρc
u
t = w
u
t − put ,
the aggregate production function,
yut = a
u
t + n
u
t ,
and the aggregate equilibrium of goods markets,
yut = c
u
t ,
we get the natural path of the aggregate consumption, which also equals the aggregate output,
y˜ut = c˜
u
t =
1 + ψ
ρ+ ψ
aut .
Combining the previous expression with the aggregate Euler equation, we determine the
natural equilibrium interest rate,
δ
1 + δ
r˜t+1 = ρEt
{
c˜ut+1
}− c˜ut ,
implying,
r˜t+1 =
ρ(1 + δ)(1 + ψ)
δ(ρ+ ψ)
(Et
{
aut+1
}− aut ).
We now turn to the natural path of relative variables, defined as,
xrt =
1
2
[
xft − xht
]
.
In the natural equilibrium, the financial market is complete, implying,
2ρc˜rt = − (1− 2α) s˜t.
Combining this expression with the relative leisure-consumption arbitrage condition, we get,
ψn˜rt −
1− 2α
2
s˜t = w˜rt − p˜rt .
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Using the definition of terms of trade,
p˜rt =
(1− 2α)
2
s˜t,
the relative leisure-consumption arbitrage condition becomes,
ψn˜rt = w˜
r
t .
The relative pricing equation yields,
s˜t = p˜f,t − p˜h,t = 2 (w˜rt − a˜rt ) ,
which, combined with the previous condition, yields,
ψn˜rt =
1
2
s˜t + art . (19)
On the other hand, the risk-sharing condition, combined with the relative equilibrium con-
dition on goods markets yields,
y˜rt = −$αs˜t,
where $α =
(1−2α)2+4ρµα(1−α)
2ρ .
Using the relative production function,
n˜rt = y˜
r
t − art ,
we get,
n˜rt = −$αs˜t − art . (20)
Combining (19) and (20), we get the natural path of terms of trade,
s˜t = − 2 (1 + ψ)(1 + 2ψ$α)a
r
t .
Summing up, using the relative equilibrium condition of goods markets to get c˜rt , and the relative
production function to get n˜rt , we get,
s˜t = − 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t ,
c˜rt =
(1 + ψ) (1− 2α)
ρ (1 + 2ψ$α)
art ,
n˜rt =
2$α − 1
(1 + 2ψ$α)
art .
The quadratic welfare–based loss function
The welfare criterion writes,
ωT =
T∑
t=0
βtE0
{∫ 1
0
[
1
2
Uht (j) +
1
2
Uft (j)
]
dj
}
=
T∑
t=0
βtE0
{∫ 1
0
[
UuC,t(j)− UuN,t(j)
]
dj
}
.
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After using the symmetry among agents, we get
UuC,t(j) = U
u
C,t =
1
2 (1− ρ)
(
Cht
)1−ρ
+
1
2 (1− ρ)
(
Cft
)1−ρ
,
UuN,t(j) = U
u
N,t =
1
2 (1 + ψ)
(
Nht
)1+ψ
+
1
2 (1 + ψ)
(
Nft
)1+ψ
.
We begin the derivation by taking a second order approximation of UuN,t,
UuN,t '
N1+ψ
1 + ψ
+N1+ψ
[
nut +
1 + ψ
2
(
[nut ]
2 + [nrt ]
2
)]
+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Recalling that the approximation is taken around the steady state assuming
[
ait
]2 = 0 (see
Benigno and Woodford [2005]), second order approximations of production functions write,
nht +
1
2
[
aht + n
h
t
]2
= yht + dp
h
t + t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
nft +
1
2
[
aft + n
f
t
]2
= yft + dp
f
t + t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
where t.i.p gathers terms independent of the policy problem, and where,
dpit =
θ
2
var (pi,t) ,
implying
[
dpit
]2 ∈ O (∥∥ξ3∥∥).
Combining these expressions, we get,
nut+
1
2
[nut ]
2+
1
2
[nrt ]
2+
1
2
aht n
h
t+
1
2
aft n
f
t = y
u
t +
1
2
[yut ]
2+
1
2
[yrt ]
2+
θ
4
var (ph,t)+
θ
4
var (pf,t)+t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
The previous expression is then plugged in the approximation of UuN,t,
UuN,t ' N1+ψ{yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 − 1
2
aht n
h
t −
1
2
aft n
f
t +
θ
4
var (ph,t) +
θ
4
var (pf,t) +
ψ
2
[nut ]
2 +
ψ
2
[nrt ]
2}
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Now focusing on UuC,t, we compute a second order approximation of U
u
C,t,
UuC,t '
C1−ρ
1− ρ + C
1−ρ
[
cut +
1− ρ
2
(
[cut ]
2 + [crt ]
2
)]
+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
A second order approximation of final goods markets equilibria gives,
yht +
1
2
[
yht
]2
= (1− α)
(
cht + µαst +
1
2
[
cht + αµst
]2)
+ α
(
cft + µ (1− α) st +
1
2
[
cft + µ (1− α) st
]2)
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
yft +
1
2
[
yft
]2
= (1− α)
(
cft − µαst +
1
2
[
cft − µαst
]2)
+ α
(
cht − µ (1− α) st +
1
2
[
cht − (1− µα) st
]2)
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
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Combining these expressions, we get,
yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 = cut +
1
2
[cut ]
2 +
1
2
[crt ]
2 +
µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
or,
cut +
1
2
[cut ]
2 +
1
2
[crt ]
2 = yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 − µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
The previous expression is then plugged in the approximation of UuC,t,
UuC,t ' C1−ρ{yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 − µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2 − ρ
2
[cut ]
2 − ρ
2
[crt ]
2}+ t.i.p+O (∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Now combining UuN,t and U
u
C,t, we get,
Uut = U
u
C,t − UuN,t ' C1−ρ{yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 − µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2 − ρ
2
[cut ]
2 − ρ
2
[crt ]
2
−N1+ψ{yut +
1
2
[yut ]
2 +
1
2
[yrt ]
2 +
θ
4
var (ph,t) +
θ
4
var (pf,t)− 12a
h
t n
h
t −
1
2
aft n
f
t
+
ψ
2
[nut ]
2 +
ψ
2
[nrt ]
2}+ t.i.p+O (∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Using the fact that,
N1+ψ =
Y
A
Nψ = Y C−ρ = C1−ρ,
we get,
Uut ' C1−ρ{−
µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2 − ρ
2
[
[cut ]
2 + [crt ]
2
]
+
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t
− ψ
2
[
[nut ]
2 + [nrt ]
2
]
− θ
4
var (ph,t)− θ4var (pf,t)}+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Using,
nut = y
u
t − aut ,
yut = c
u
t ,
we get,
Uut ' C1−ρ{−
µα (1− α)
2
[st]
2 − θ
4
var (ph,t)− θ4var (pf,t)
− ρ
2
[cut ]
2 − ρ
2
[crt ]
2 − ψ
2
[nrt ]
2 +
1
2
aht n
h
t +
1
2
aft n
f
t
− ψ
2
[
[cut ]
2 − 2cut aut
]
}+ t.i.p+O (∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
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We then manage to make the term [cut − c˜ut ]2 appear in the welfare criterion, we get,
Uut '
C1−ρ
2
{−µα (1− α) [st]2 − θ2var (ph,t)−
θ
2
var (pf,t)
− (ρ+ ψ) [cut − c˜ut ]2 − 2 (ρ+ ψ) cut c˜ut + 2ψcut aut
− ρ [crt ]2 − ψ [nrt ]2 + aht nht + aft nft }+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
Using the defintion of c˜ut ,
c˜ut =
1 + ψ
ρ+ ψ
aut ,
we get,
Uut '
C1−ρ
2
{−µα (1− α) [st]2 − θ2var (ph,t)−
θ
2
var (pf,t)
− (ρ+ ψ) [cut − c˜ut ]2 − 2 (1 + ψ) cut aut + 2ψcut aut
− ρ [crt ]2 − ψ [nrt ]2 + aht nht + aft nft }+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
We then use the following relation,
aht n
h
t + a
f
t n
f
t = 2n
u
t a
u
t + 2n
r
ta
r
t ,
= 2cut a
u
t + 2n
r
ta
r
t + t.i.p,
to get,
Uut '
C1−ρ
2
{−µα (1− α) [st]2 − θ2var (ph,t)−
θ
2
var (pf,t)
− (ρ+ ψ) [cut − c˜ut ]2 − ρ [crt ]2 − ψ [nrt ]2 + 2nrtart}
+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) .
In the next step, we show that 2nrta
r
t can be expressed as a function of s˜t, c˜
r
t , n
r
t . We start
with the following decomposition,
2nrta
r
t =
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
nrta
r
t +
(
2ψ
2$α − 1
1 + 2ψ$α
art
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2ψenrt
nrt .
Using,
nrt = y
r
t − art ,
yrt = (1− 2α) crt − 2µα (1− α) st,
and using natural equilibrium expressions of s˜t, c˜rt , n˜
r
t ,
s˜t = − 2 (1 + ψ)1 + 2ψ$αa
r
t ,
c˜rt =
(1 + ψ) (1− 2α)
ρ (1 + 2ψ$α)
art ,
n˜rt =
2$α − 1
(1 + 2ψ$α)
art ,
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we get,
2nrta
r
t = 2c
r
t
(
(1 + ψ) (1− 2α)
(1 + 2ψ$α)
art
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρecrt
− 2µα (1− α) st
(
2 (1 + ψ)
1 + 2ψ$α
art
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−est
+ 2ψn˜rtn
r
t + t.i.p,
or
2nrta
r
t = 2ρc˜
r
t c
r
t + 2ψn˜
r
tn
r
t + 2µα (1− α) s˜tst + t.i.p.
Plugging this relation in the welfare criterion, we get,
Uut '
C1−ρ
2
{−θ
2
var (ph,t)− θ2var (pf,t)− µα (1− α) [ŝt]
2
− (ρ+ ψ) [ĉut ]2 − ρ [ĉrt ]2 − ψ [n̂rt ]2}+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
where x̂t = xt− x˜t are variables expressed in deviation to their natural equilibrium expressions.
Actualizing and summing, we get,
ωT =
T∑
t=0
βtE0 {Uut } .
Following Woodford [2003] we know that,
T∑
t=0
βtvar (pi,t) =
T∑
t=0
βt
pi2i,t
ki
,
where ki = (
1−ηiβ)(1−ηi)
ηi
,.
Finally, the welfare criterion criterion writes,
ωT = −C
1−ρ
2
T∑
t=0
βtEt{ θ2khpi
2
h,t +
θ
2kf
pi2f,t + (ρ+ ψ) [ĉ
u
t ]
2
+ µα (1− α) [ŝt]2 + ρ [ĉrt ]2 + ψ [n̂rt ]2}+ t.i.p+O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) ,
where t.i.p gathers terms independent of the problem and O
(∥∥ξ3∥∥) high order terms.
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